Category: Law

100

DoJ's Gag Order On Reason Has Been Lifted — But The Real Story Is More Outrageous Than We Thought

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Last Friday the folks at Reason confirmed what I suggested on Thursday — that the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, after hitting Reason with a federal grand jury subpoena to unmask anonymous hyperbolic commenters, secured a gag order that prevented them from writing about it.

Nick Gillespie and Matt Welch describe how it all went down. Read it.

So, the truth is out — and it's more outrageous than you thought, even more outrageous than it appears at first glance.

What, you might ask, could be more outrageous than the United States Department of Justice issuing a questionable subpoena targeting speech protected by the First Amendment, and then abusing the courts to prohibit journalists from writing about it?

The answer lies in the everyday arrogance of unchecked power.

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86

Did The Department of Justice Get A Gag Order Silencing Reason About The Grand Jury Subpoena?

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On June 8 — ably assisted, as I am now, by my co-blogger Patrick — I reported on a federal grand jury subpoena issued to Reason.com in an effort to unmask commenters who used obnoxious hyperbole about Judge Katherine Forrest, who sentenced Ross "Dread Pirate Roberts" Ulbricht to life imprisonment in the Silk Road case.

In that post, I reported that Assistant U.S. Attorney Niketh Velamoor indicated that he "believed" that there was a gag order prohibiting Reason.com from disclosing the existence of the subpoena. I expressed skepticism about that claim because Mr. Velamoor had just two days before signed a letter telling Reason.com that the Department of Justice asked, but did not require, that the subpoena be kept secret.

Since then, additional factors lead me to believe that there is, in fact, an under-seal gag order purporting to prohibit Reason.com from disclosing or discussing the grand jury subpoena.

This post discusses why I think that, and why such a gag order would be an abuse of the law and a grave abuse of power.

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39

Partial Victory In Patterico's Free Speech Case Before Ninth Circuit

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Long-time readers may recall that, together with Ron Coleman, I'm pro bono counsel to Patrick Frey, who blogs as Patterico.

Patrick was targeted with a thoroughly vexatious lawsuit attacking his blogging. Ron and I won the case in the trial court, securing the dismissal of plaintiff Nadia Naffe's federal and state claims.

Today the Ninth Circuit upheld the result in part and reversed it in part. The opinion is here.

You may recall that the trial court dismissed the entire case based on two points. First, the court agreed with us that Ms. Naffe did not state any facts showing that Mr. Frey blogged in his official capacity as a Deputy District Attorney, and therefore her Title 28 U.S.C. section 1983 claim for civil rights violations "under color of law" could not survive, because Section 1983 only applies to state actors. Second, the trial court — on its own — questioned whether Ms. Naffe could prove the $75,000 in damages necessary for diversity jurisdiction1, and eventually found that she had failed to make a showing of sufficient damages.

The Ninth Circuit agreed on the first part and disagreed on the second.

In a published decision that will be significant for public employees who blog, the Ninth Circuit agreed that Mr. Frey didn't blog as a "state actor" for purposes of Section 1983 just because he's a county employee. The Court agreed that Naffe had not stated any facts giving rise to a reasonable inference that Patrick was blogging as part of his official responsibilities. "Frey is a county prosecutor whose official responsibilities do not include publicly commenting about conservative politics and current events." The Court also rejected Naffe's argument that Patrick's blogging was related to his work as a county prosecutor because he discussed criminal law issues. Finally, the Court noted that Patrick frequently reminded readers that he blogged and Tweeted in his private capacity, not his official capacity.

Crucially, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that a state employee can talk about the nature of their work without transforming their speech into state action. That's key for the free speech rights of all public employees. The Court noted "if we were to consider every comment by a state employee to be state action, the constitutional rights of public officers to speak their minds as private citizens would be substantially chilled to the detriment of the 'marketplace of ideas.'" That's what we argued on appeal, and Eugene Volokh ably argued in his amicus brief on behalf of the Digital Media Law Project: Naffe's proposed interpretation of the law would mean that a teacher couldn't blog about teaching, or a police officer about police work, without transforming their writing into official "state action" subject to civil rights lawsuits. That portion of the Ninth Circuit's opinion will be useful whenever a state employee is sued under the theory that their private speech should be treated as official action.

However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court's dismissal of the state claims. At issue was the standard the trial court applied. Having questioned whether Ms. Naffe could prove $75,000 in damages, as required for diversity jurisdiction, the trial court found that she had not proven such damages by a preponderance of the evidence. The Ninth Circuit found that was the wrong standard. Instead, it found, a trial court should only dismiss a case for lack of diversity jurisdiction when it appears to a "legal certainty" that the plaintiff cannot recover at least $75,000. That's an extremely low standard for Naffe to satisfy, and the court found she satisfied it.

So: the case goes back to the trial court. When it does, we'll have the opportunity to ask the trial court to address our motions that were mooted by its prior ruling. Specifically, we filed an anti-SLAPP motion attacking Ms. Naffe's claims as meritless attempts to chill speech, and a motion under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1030 seeking to compel her to post a bond to cover the costs of the case. We're confident those motions are correct and look forward to pursuing them.

Meanwhile, as before, it remains a privilege to work with Ron Coleman and to defend Patrick Frey's free speech. Thanks to Eugene Volokh, whose excellent brief on the free speech implications was instrumental.

80

Media Coverage Of The Reason Debacle

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Ken's post of Monday on the overreaching attempt by the Department of Justice, and Manhattan United States Attorney Preet Bhahara, to subpoena the identities of commenters at Reason for silly rhetoric concerning a federal judge, has gotten some traction in the tech and legal blogospheres, and bit of mainstream coverage. Why the political media at large aren't covering this to a greater extent is a question we can't answer, but it's surprising, given that Reason is one of their own. Perhaps they figure that they've got their running shoes on, and they're happy the bear is going after someone else.

Nonetheless, we'd be remiss in failing to point out that a number of voices have been raised in Reason's defense, or at least covered the situation. For those who are following this issue, here's a by no means inclusive list of journalists and bloggers who've covered the story.

Editorial Board – New York Post. (Preet Bhahara's off-base strike at internet trolls.)

Virginia Postrel – Bloomberg View.

Scott Greenfield – Simple Justice.

Glenn Reynolds – Instapundit.

Charles C. W. Cooke – National Review (and on Mr. Cooke's worthy podcast, Mad Dogs & Englishmen.)

Ilya Somin – Volokh Conspiracy.

Russia Today. (Yes, Russia Today. Because Vladimir Putin is all about free press and free speech.)

Andy Greenberg – Slate and Wired.  (I should add that Mr. Greenberg reacted very graciously to my angrily pointing out that he'd incorrectly stated the law, and updated an early version of the story.)

Charlotte Allen – Independent Womens Forum.

Damon Linker – The Week.

Barnini Chakraborty – Fox News.

Jazz Shaw – Hot Air.  (A pro-prosecution take to the effect that some terrorists may actually own deadly woodchippers.)

Ed Morrissey – Hot Air. (A dissenting view, more concerned with the threat to free speech than the threat of woodchippers.)

"Ace" – Ace of Spades HQ. (Who points out that the beast can be trained to attack in other directions, depending on its master, but it remains a beast.)

Mike Masnick – Techdirt. (With more background on the Ross "Dread Pirate Roberts" Ulbricht case.)

Joe Mullin – Ars Technica. (Another site that covered the Dread Pirate well.)

Annalee Newitz – Gizmodo. (This is why Gizmodo doesn't harvest IP addresses.)

C. J. Ciaramella – Buzzfeed.

Tim Lynch – Cato Institute. (Reason's less druggy older libertarian brother.)

Joe Palazzolo – Wall Street Journal Law Blog.

Doug Mataconis – Outside the Beltway. (Noting the interesting timing, just after Elonis.)

"Dana" Non-White – Patterico.

Rick Moran – American Thinker.

Ryan Radia – Competitive Enterprise Institute.  (A scholarly approach.)

Steven Hayward – Power Line.  ("An in-kind contribution by DOJ to Rand Paul")

Pat Beall – Palm Beach Post.

"Alex in CT" – Right Thinking.

Kate Vinton – Forbes.

Peter Ingemi – Da Tech Guy. (On the stupidity of the comments, as well as the investigation.)

Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang. (Covering the "hypocritical braggarts" behind this investigation.)

"The Two Way" – National Public Radio.

TYLER FUCKING DURDEN! – Zero Hedge.

Editorial Board – Investors Business Daily.

Jack Marshall – Ethics Alarms.

Virgil Vaduva – Punk Rock Libertarians.

Katherine Forrest – Above The Law.  (Mildly disappointing for lack of substance and focus on the inanity of Reason's commenters, but ATL's own commenters are even worse than Reason's. Perhaps it was "meta.")

Brendan James – Talking Points Memo.

Kari Paul – Vice Motherboard.

And finally…

Nick Gillespie – Reason.com. (Please keep your comments civil.)

We don't endorse or agree with all of the coverage this situation has gotten, but obviously we think it's important. The only surprise is that it hasn't gotten more reporting. If you know of other coverage, from blogs or traditional media, please let me know in comments below, and I'll keep this list updated.

We will continue to cover this matter, as we are able.

566

Department Of Justice Uses Grand Jury Subpoena To Identify Anonymous Commenters on a Silk Road Post at Reason.com

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The United States Department of Justice is using federal grand jury subpoenas to identify anonymous commenters engaged in typical internet bluster and hyperbole in connection with the Silk Road prosecution. DOJ is targeting Reason.com, a leading libertarian website whose clever writing is eclipsed only by the blowhard stupidity of its commenting peanut gallery.

Why is the government using its vast power to identify these obnoxious asshats, and not the other tens of thousands who plague the internet?

Because these twerps mouthed off about a judge.

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61

Dennis Hastert And Federal Prosecutorial Power

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This week, federal prosecutors indicted former Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert.

Hastert is charged with two federal crimes: structuring financial transactions to evade IRS reporting requirements in violation of 31 U.S.C. section 5324(a)(3) and lying to the FBI in violation of the notorious 18 U.S.C. section 1001. Both charges reflect the breadth of federal prosecutorial power.

The indictment has mostly inspired chatter about what it doesn't say. Hastert is charged with structuring withdrawals of less than $10,000 (so that they would not be reported to the IRS) so that he could pay off an unidentified person for Hastert's unidentified past misconduct. What past misconduct, or threatened accusation of misconduct, could lead Hastert to pay $3.5 million? The indictment doesn't say, but it has been drafted to imply that the allegation of past misconduct relates to Hastert's job as a teacher and coach in Yorkville, Illinois. Hastert isn't charged with doing anything to the accuser, and the accuser isn't charged with extortion.

As Radley Balko has pointed out, structuring (or "smurfing") charges are extremely flexible. They demonstrate the reality of how Americans targeted by the Department of Justice can be charged. We imagine law enforcement operating like we see on TV: someone commits a crime, everyone knows what the crime is, law enforcement reacts by charging them with that crime. But that's not how federal prosecution always works. Particularly with high-profile targets, federal prosecution is often an exercise in searching for a theory to prosecute someone that the feds would like to prosecute. There is an element of creativity: what federal statute can we find to prosecute this person?

We'll learn more about the reasons for Hastert's payments in the course of the case (or through Department of Justice leaks calculated to harm him). I suspect we'll find that the investigation happened like this: the feds heard that Hastert was paying someone off based on an accusation of old misconduct, determined that the misconduct was too old (or out of their jurisdiction) to prosecute, and started subpoenaing records and interviewing witnesses until they found some element of what he was doing that was a federal crime. In other words, they targeted the man, and then looked for the crime.

The problem with this scenario is that federal criminal law is extremely broad. Practically speaking, it gives federal prosecutors vast discretion to determine who among us faces criminal charges. If you think that you're safe because you've never committed a crime, you may learn to your surprise that you're wrong.

The rational response to this situation is clear: don't trust the feds, don't talk to the feds. But Dennis Hastert, like many accomplished people, believed he could talk his way out of the situation. When the FBI came to interview him, he didn't refuse to answer and call his lawyer. According to the indictment, he confirmed in response to an FBI agent's question that he was withdrawing cash in order to store it because he didn't feel the banking system was safe. For that, he's been charged with lying to federal agents.

This is another aspect of the federal government's vast prosecutorial discretion. Hastert's alleged false statement happened in December 2014. When agents interviewed him, I guarantee you that the feds had already made their case. They had already put witnesses before the grand jury, they had already used grand jury subpoenas to get Hastert's bank records, they already knew exactly how they would charge and prove up the structuring charge. When they went to interview Hastert, there were only three possible outcomes: he would refuse to talk, he would confess, or he would lie in a way they could easily disprove. They were looking either for the confession, which would make their case easier, or the lie, that would give them a new theory on which to charge him with a crime. Under Section 1001 a lie must be material to be criminal. But the materiality element is weak. It only requires the government to show that the lie is the sort of statement that could conceivably influence the FBI. It doesn't require the government to show that the lie actually had any impact whatsoever. Thus the FBI can show up with its case ready to indict, fish for a lie that they know is a lie, and pile that charge on top of whatever the substantive charge is. That's why I bring up Section 1001 so often and explain why it means you must shut up. You can be prosecuted for as little as saying "no, I didn't" in response to a already-documented accusation.

The criminal justice system needs to be able to prosecute perjury — lies under oath before a tribunal. And I can see why it needs to be able to punish false statements to the federal government that represent an attempt to commit fraud (say, false statements to get a passport) or that impact an investigation (say, a false accusation that triggers an inquiry).

But ask yourself: what is the legitimate basis for giving the feds the power to prosecute people for exculpatory lies that have no impact whatsoever on their operation?

From the federal government's perspective, the basis is clear: it's a tool to help them charge people they want to charge.

From the citizen's perspective, this situation points to one obvious conclusion: shut up. Never answer a federal agent's questions without a thorough debriefing with a qualified lawyer first.

24

Minnesota Court Rules That Criminal Libel Statute Is Unconstitutional

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A few states retain archaic statutes making some types of libel a crime. They're rarely used. They show up fairly regularly in stupid legal threats, and very occasionally in politically motivated harassment prosecutions.

Yesterday the Minnesota Court of Appeals struck down that state's criminal libel statute.

Minnesota's statute criminalizes statements that "expose[] a person or a group, class or association to hatred, contempt, ridicule, degradation or disgrace in society, or injury to business or occupation." It offers a defense of justification for a few exceptions:

Violation of subdivision 2 is justified if:

(1) the defamatory matter is true and is communicated with good motives and for justifiable ends; or

(2) the communication is absolutely privileged; or

(3) the communication consists of fair comment made in good faith with respect to persons participating in matters of public concern; or

(4) the communication consists of a fair and true report or a fair summary of any judicial, legislative or other public or official proceedings; or

(5) the communication is between persons each having an interest or duty with respect to the subject matter of the communication and is made with intent to further such interest or duty.

Isanti County prosecuted Timothy Robert Turner for violation of this statute when he posted malicious ads on Craigslist in the name of his ex-girlfriend and her daughter soliciting strangers for sex. He added their cell phone numbers. Timothy Robert Turner is scum.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed that Turner's actions were contemptible and defamatory. But they found that the statute violates the First Amendment. First, it doesn't recognize that truth is an absolute defense to defamation — under the statute, you could be criminally prosecuted for making a true statement without "good motives." Second, it criminally punishes false statements about public figures or matters of public concern without requiring the government to show that the statements were made with actual malice — the long-standing standard protecting such speech.

Notice that the loathsome Timothy Robert Turner's speech was unquestionably false, and wasn't uttered about public figures or matters of public concern. But the Court overturned the statute in his case and reversed his conviction anyway. Why? In First Amendment cases, when a statute is so defective that it prohibits a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech, courts will allow a litigant to challenge the entire statute even if the particular litigant's speech could constitutionally be punished. That's sometimes called the overbreadth doctrine. Here, the state conceded that the statute was overbroad (and possibly even conceded that it's substantially overbroad — it's hard to tell). The state asked the court to employ a remedy in this situation — to construe the statute narrowly to make it constitutional, that is, to say "Minnesota can only use this statute in cases involving false statements, and only by proving actual malice in cases involving public figures or matters of public interest." Courts are supposed to do that when they reasonably can rather than strike down an entire statute. Here, the court not unreasonably found that they'd have to fundamentally rewrite the statute to save it, and refused to do so. The line between narrowly construing a statute to save it and "rewriting" a statute is not perfectly clear.

The bottom line: the Minnesota court recognized that an archaic criminal libel statute was invalid when it didn't include the free speech protections afforded modern civil defamation defendants.

Eugene Volokh submitted a clearly effective amicus brief. Timothy Robert Turner escapes conviction, but hopefully never gets a job or relationship again thanks to Google.

85

How To Spot And Critique Censorship Tropes In The Media's Coverage Of Free Speech Controversies

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American journalists and pundits rely upon vigorous free speech, but are not reliable supporters of it. They both instruct and reflect their fickle audience.

It's easy to spot overt calls for censorship from the commentariat. Those have become more common in the wake of both tumultuous events (like the violence questionably attributed to the "Innocence of Muslims" video, or Pamela Geller's "Draw Muhammad" contest) and mundane ones (like fraternity brothers recorded indulging in racist chants).

But it's harder to detect the subtle pro-censorship assumptions and rhetorical devices that permeate media coverage of free speech controversies. In discussing our First Amendment rights, the media routinely begs the question — it adopts stock phrases and concepts that presume that censorship is desirable or constitutional, and then tries to pass the result off as neutral analysis. This promotes civic ignorance and empowers deliberate censors.

Fortunately, this ain't rocket science. Americans can train themselves to detect and question the media's pro-censorship tropes. I've collected some of the most pervasive and familiar ones. This post is designed as a resource, and I'll add to it as people point out more examples and more tropes.

When you see the media using these tropes, ask yourself: what normative message is the author advancing, and does it have any basis in law?

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46

Ville de Granby Takes The Lead In Protecting Endangered Official Feels

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[AP: Ville de Granby, Québec, Canada] Shouting their slogan Je suis important, vous ne pouvez pas irriter mon cul délicate, public employees celebrated a legal victory over internet abuse this week in Granby, a town in southern Quebec.

That victory came when the Granby municipal council unanimously passed an amendment to expand Article 17 of the municipal code. For years that code has forbidden the populace to "provoke, insult, revile, blaspheme or harass" police officers or municipal employees in the course of their duties. Last week's amended explicitly expanded the ban to prohibit insults online or in social media.

"This measure patches a gaping hole in our protection," said Robert Riel, deputy mayor of Granby. "People felt free to insult public employees online. Now they know they can't." Riel — occasionally pausing to collect himself — described how his ability to do his job had been ruthlessly disrupted by citizens criticizing his competence, his policy choices, and his 2010 arrest for attempting sexual intercourse with an award-winning snowman in Granby's public square during the town's Winterlude festival.

"That snowperson was extremely realistic and provocative," Riel added. "But my feelings are just as real."

Though it had strong support from elected officials, local police were the driving force behind the recent amendment. For two years, Granby law enforcement has been the target of relentless criticism, questioning, and even satire by the Facebook group Les policiers zélé de Granby, without any regarding to their rights as public officials and Canadians to be protected from offense. Some of the unflattering commentary was not even in French. Marco Beauregard, directeur of the department, recounted the toll that insults have taken. "My officers are out there ever day, putting themselves on the line," he said. "I owe it to them, and to their families, to do everything I can to make sure they come home at the end of the shift with their feelings intact."

Officers have reported being upset, disquieted, and even hurt by social media comments. "How can a public officer do his or her job," Beauregard demanded, "when people feel free to question the way they do it — and even to mock them? What makes them think they can talk about whatever they want?"

"My journey of improvement on anger-management issues is not an appropriate topic of public conversation, especially after last September," argued Beauregard, referencing an incident that led to the partial destruction of a traffic barrier, two police cars and the lobby of a local Tim Hortons.

"Being Canadian means standing up for your rights," said municipal council member M. Pascal Bonin. "That's all we are doing — using our authority to stand up for our right not to be insulted. It's a fundamental right, and it shouldn't yield to anything."

Bonin himself has been the target of rude jokes regarding his name, despite his repeated and patient explanations that it is pronounced Bon – eeen. "If citizens can say what they want about civic employees, you're going to see the whole culture of public life change," he said. "Before you know it, the only sort of people who will run for office or take a public job are the hardened sort that can just shrug off criticism as part of their job, or who think that they are only there to serve the public."

"And what would that look like," Bonin asked, shuddering.

57

Two Stories About The Criminal Justice System And Consequences

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Dateline, Washington D.C.: The Drug Enforcement Administration, pressed by Congress for answers about its treatment of Andrew Chong, has no answers to give.

I wrote about Andrew Chong before. He's the young man the DEA arrested in San Diego when they caught him smoking dope at a friend's house during a raid. DEA agents handcuffed him, locked him into a room, and left him there five days without food or water. He drank his own urine, eventually attempted suicide, and was close to death when he was discovered. He suffers from post traumatic stress disorder, not surprisingly. DEA agents claimed that he was left there through an oversight and that nobody could hear him shouting for help. An investigation determined that you could very clearly hear someone shouting for help from that room.

The consequences? Four written reprimands, a five-day suspension, and a seven-day suspension.

If I seize someone, handcuff them, lock them in a room, and leave them to die, I will suffer severe consequences. I will lose my job, especially if I acted while performing my duties. I will go to jail. I will suffer catastrophic personal financial losses. My name will be broadcast far and wide.

That's the difference between me and a federal employee.

The DEA agents who arrested Andrew Chong for smoking dope and left him to die got reprimands or suspensions that were shorter than my last tension headache. You and I — the taxpayers — paid Andrew Chong the $4.1 million settlement he secured; the agents did not. They are not named in any of the articles about the incident. They will not go to jail. They will not lose their jobs.

Free of significant consequence, they will continue to exercise their armed authority to inflict consequences on other people who break the law.

Dateline, Texas:

In 2013, Judge Susan Criss presided over the trial of Alisha Marie Drake, who stood accused of the horrific crime of videotaping the rape of a 14-month-old child. During jury selection, a Jehovah's Witness in the jury pool told Judge Criss that he would not view child pornography and that his religion did not allow him to judge others (an issue familiar to anyone who has ever encountered a Jehovah's Witness in a jury pool). Judge Criss berated the juror and belittled his religious beliefs:

So if it grosses you out, then you can take it out on the person in punishment because it can’t possibly gross you out more than it grossed out that child. So that’s what my God tells me.

Eventually Judge Criss ordered the prospective juror arrested:

Juror No. 48: Your Honor, I’m one of Jehovah’s Witnesses and I believe that Jehovah God is a Supreme Judge and it is not in my place to judge anyone else or to have, for that matter, for them to be – –

The Court: All right. I understand that. We have Jehovah’s Witnesses all the time. But you know what? If you get picked on this jury, you get picked on this jury, and Jehovah can visit you in the jail.

Juror No. 48: Okay. Then – –

The Court: Have a seat, sir.

Juror No. 48: I guess they have to visit me.

The Court: All right. Arrest him. Take him into custody. Take him into custody right now. I’m not playing. See you later.

Judge Criss later explained to the thoroughly cowed jury pool that her experience as a sex crimes prosecutor — which she related in detail — taught her it was difficult to find willing jurors in sex crimes cases, and that she would not be excusing people. "And I'm not playing, and I don't care if anybody likes it or not."

Yesterday the Court of Appeals overturned the conviction. Even though Drake's appointed attorney did not bother to object to Judge Criss' actions, the court found that her comments about the case improperly conveyed her opinion of Drake's guilt, and that her arrest of the prospective juror deprived Drake of an impartial jury by intimidating jurors from confessing possible biases.

But the public opinion by the Court of Appeals did not name Judge Susan Criss. That's a matter of tradition and professional courtesy. You'd have to figure out her name by Googling the case, or by getting it from court records or from someone who knows.

Susan Criss is now in private practice, although she enjoys a public life commenting on her past cases. Criss is defiant about her actions in the Drake case. She won't face any State Bar proceeding. She won't face any consequences at all for her conduct.

These stories are not the exception. They are the rule. The rule is this: citizens generally face consequences for breaking the law and violating the rights of others, but those with the power to administer those laws and impose those consequences rarely face any themselves.

That's the justice system.

100

Prenda Law And The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Appellate Argument

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It's time for an update on the exploits of Prenda Law, that team of crooked, bumbling copyright trolls that's been stomped by judges nationwide.

Today, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard oral argument in a Prenda case. Prenda's principals have appealed Judge Wright's catastrophic May 2013 sanctions order against them. It was worth the long wait for court-watchers — though probably not for Prenda.

Judge Wright faced complex problems: given that Prenda had dismissed its copyright-trolling case, what sort of sanctions power did he retain, and what sort of due process did he have to extend to the Prendarasts to invoke that power? On appeal, Team Prenda argues that Judge Wright's sanctions and attorney fees award exceeded his power because (1) Team Prenda's inviduals — like John Steele and Paul Hansmeier — were not properly before the court, and (2) Judge Wright effectively levied criminal sanctions, triggering procedural rights that he did not extend to Team Prenda. John Doe — the defendant who triggered this whole escapade, successfully represented by Morgan Pietz — argued that the bizarre and extreme facts supported all of Judge Wright's order under applicable law.

It's foolish to bet on specific outcomes based on oral argument. But that's the kind of fool I am. I predict that the Ninth Circuit will uphold part of Judge Wright's sanctions order — the part that represents a civil sanction — and send the case back to the trial court for a more complete hearing on criminal sanctions.

That's not good for Prenda.

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45

Was Ebony Dickens' Facebook Post Criminal?

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I'm waiting for the Supreme Court to decide Elonis v. United States, which may or may not clarify the difference between "true threats" and speech protected by the First Amendment. It's possible that the Supreme Court will clarify whether a "true threat" must be both objectively threatening (that is, a reasonable person hearing the threat would believe it to be a sincere expression of intent to to harm) and subjectively threatening (that is, the accused intended for the threat to be taken as a sincere expression of intent to do harm). Or it's possible that the Supreme Court will merely decide whether the federal interstate threat statute requires both.

In the meanwhile, let's look at a kind of case in which the distinction might make a difference.

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